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RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SECTOR IN TRANSITION  
 




This paper examines current situation in Russian agricultural and food sector and evaluates 
forthcoming development. Russia’s agricultural production diminished by half at the beginning of 
the 1990s, and since that the production has hardly grown. In fact, Russia is one of the biggest food 
importers in the world. Particularly in livestock sector the situation is difficult. Number of livestock 
has not grown according to expectations and production does not satisfy domestic demand. Crop 
husbandry, by contrast, has export potential, but fluctuations in export volumes have been great. 
Furthermore, quality of grain has not always met standards. Russia’s food industry has grown 
rapidly in the past few years, even though Russia has not reached self-sufficiency. Foreign 
investments have improved quality level of Russia’s food industry. However, food imports will 
continue in the next ten years in bulk food products. For example current meat import volumes will 
remain more or less unchanged. Moreover, import demand of more specialised production inputs 





























Russian agro food sector, dairy sector, meat production, crop husbandry, food industry. 




Russia is one of the largest food importers in the world and it has become a significant, growing 
market area for food exporters. The rapid economic growth in recent years and the increase in the 
real incomes of the consumers have led to a rapid increase in food imports. On November 6 2003, 
the EU and Russia have adopted the concept of European Common Economic Area, and have 
launched discussions on future trade. The EU is the largest trade partner of Russia (40 % of its 
external trade, to exceed 50 % after the EU enlargement), and these discussions, that aim at 
promoting and facilitating trade and investment as well as harmonizing regulations are of particular 
importance. 
 
The future accession of Russia to the WTO will have significant consequences for the EU. This is 
likely to change the negotiating positions and the alliances formed between the main participants to 
the negotiations, in a way that is still unclear for EU interest. Russia could emerge as a much more 
important market for EU products. In addition, Russia’s performances, options and strategies  about 
themes like food safety, technical barriers of trade, environmental protection and rural development 
are still uncertain.  
 
Because Russia is likely to emerge as  a much more important trade partner for the EU in the future, 
it has appeared necessary to consider various issues surrounding the EU-Russia relations regarding 
agricultural products. This paper concentrates on three main themes. Firstly, development of 
Russian macro-economic situation is shortly presented. Secondly, Russian agricultural sector is 
presented in more detail; problems, possibilities and future trends in dairy, meat and grain sector are 
analysed. Thirdly, the report examines recent development of food sector, and moreover, the 
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2. ECONOMIC SITUATION IN RUSSIA  
 
The Russian economy has made good progress in recent years. Economic growth has been a  seven 
per cent in the past few years, current accounts show a clear surplus and there has been significant 
growth in investments in both manufacturing industries and construction business. Apart from the 
rise in oil prices, the easement of the restrictions on investments and consolidation of the operating 
environment have contributed to these positive trends. Economic growth has been rapid in Russia, 
and it has regularly exceeded the prognoses of international economists. The entry of the Russian 
economy into a more stable and durable growth path has also stimulated the recovery of the 
consumer demand for foodstuffs thanks to the increase in real income and improved purchasing 
power.  
 
While economic growth in the euro-area has stagnated to 2-3 per cent, the more rapid growth in the 
Russian economy has encouraged western companies to increase their investments to Russia. In 
view of the figures for the general economic situation alone the opportunities seem excellent. On 
the other hand, Russian economy continues to be strongly focused on the energy sector and 
economic reforms are still pending. Thus Russian economy and markets are highly ambiguous, 
involving both great risks and attractive opportunities.  
 
2.1   Development of the economy: strengths... 
 
The transition of Russia into a market economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has 
obviously been a highly significant phase in the economic development of the Soviet Union/Russia. 
The socialist planned economy fell apart and Russia started to move towards a market economy. By 
the mid-1990s the total production in Russia fell to about half of the level during the Soviet era. 
After this, however, the production started to recover, until Russia was hit by a deep economic 
crisis in 1998. The crisis started as the Russian Government and Central Bank decided to 
discontinue supporting the exchange rate of the rouble in August 1998, which immediately led to 
devaluation of the rouble. By the end of the year the rouble weakened by almost to the quarter 
relative to the American dollar. The crisis had deep impacts on the Russian society and economy: 
the standard of living of the citizens fell by a third, the banking system ran into chaos and the 
political leadership suffered a serious loss of prestige as well. The middle class was the most 
seriously hit by the crisis because their assets were deposited in the banks.  
 
After the crisis the Russian economy has again grown very rapidly, but the difference between the 
general living standard in Russia and the western countries is still great. The GDP per capita in 
Russia is only about 10 per cent of that in the old EU Member States. However, in Russia a 
significant share of economic activity is not yet included in the statistics. The estimates of this 
shadow economy vary from 20 per cent presented by the Russian authorities to almost 50 per cent 
suggested by the researchers (Finpro 2004). 
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Economic growth in Russia after the crisis of 1998 has exceeded all expectations, and the same 
strong pace seems to continue. In 1999-2003 the average annual growth in the Russian economy 
was more than 6.5 per cent. According to a forecast by the Russian Government, in the early part of 
2005 the growth in the GDP was 5.6 per cent, which is somewhat lower than anticipated. Despite 
the rapid growth it seems likely that Russia is not going to meet the objective set for the 
Government by President Putin to double the GDP in a decade (Finpro 2004, Kauppapolitiikka 
2005).  
 
The economic growth has been founded on the increase in net exports. The domestic demand also 
recovered by the middle of the year 1999. In recent years, however, the domestic demand has to an 
increasing extent been directed to imported products. In 1999 and 2000 the recovery of the Russian 
industry from the crisis was facilitated by the clear devaluation of the Russian rouble and strong 
reduction in the domestic energy prices. Economic growth after the crisis accelerated thanks to the 
industry and construction activity, while the relative significance of the service sector grew 
especially in 2002 and 2003. Industrial growth has largely concentrated to a few sectors. In 2001-
2003 the fuels, colour metals and forest sector represented almost 70 per cent of the growth, while 
the share of the oil sector alone was 45 per cent. The increase in oil production volume has made a 
significant contribution to maintaining the economic growth, but Russia has also benefited from the 
high oil prices (OECD 2004a).  
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Source: Federal State Statistics, CBR. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of the production of the Russian industry. The economic crisis 
of 1998, when the production fell by more than 5 per cent from the year before, is clearly shown in 
the figure. After the crisis the industrial production has increased rapidly. In the beginning of 2005 
the Federal State Statistics Service of Russia revised the method of calculating industrial 
production, as well as updated the production figures for the previous year. The new calculation 
method corresponds to that used in the western countries. According to the Statistics Service, 
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industrial production grew by 7.3 per cent in 2004, which is more than in the preliminary data 
(BOFIT 8/2005). In the early part of 2005 the growth in industrial production slowed down to about 
4 per cent, which is lower than during the same period in the previous year (Kauppapolitiikka 
2005). 
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Source: Federal State Statistics, CBR. 
 
The growth in industrial production in Russia has concentrated to the traditional, so-called basic 
industrial sectors. Growth in, for example, the electronics industry has been modest, as can be seen 
in Table 1. In January-May 2004 industrial production was 7 per cent higher than during the same 
period in the previous year. Manufacturing industries grew by about 8 per cent, chemical industries 
by about 10 per cent and the manufacture of construction materials by almost 10 per cent. The 
production of foodstuffs has, on average, grown at about the same pace as other industrial 
production.  
 
Table 1. Growth figures for different industrial sectors in Russia (%). 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 (I-V)
Non-ferrous metals 10,0 15,0 4,9 6,0 6,2 4,2
Ferrous metals 17,0 16,0 -0,2 3,0 8,9 5,9
Fuel and energy 2,4 5,0 6,1 7,0 9,3 8,3
Wood and processing 18,0 13,0 2,6 2,4 1,5 7,0
Weighted average 9,3 10,4 4,2 5,5 7,8 6,8
Electricity -1,0 1,8 1,6 -0,7 1,0 0,4
Chemical 24,0 15,0 5,0 1,6 4,4 10,0
Machine building 17,0 20,0 7,2 2,0 9,4 14,2
Construction materials 10,0 13,0 5,5 3,0 6,4 9,8
Light industry 12,1 21,0 5,8 -3,4 -2,3 -2,3
Food 4,0 14,0 8,4 6,5 5,1 7,5
Weighted average 10,6 14,3 6,3 2,5 5,6 8,0  
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The growth of the Russian economy from the perspective of the supply has been founded on the 
increase in the productivity, because the labour force is about the same as earlier. However, the 
level of investments has been low. The growth in the total demand has in turn been based on the 
increase in the private consumption. Since 2000 the annual growth in the consumption has been 
more than 8 per cent, while the population decreased in Russia by 3 per cent between 1994 and 
2004. The growth in the consumption has been possible thanks to the increase in real incomes and 
strengthening of the currency. Between 1997 and 2003 the real wages rose by as much as 25 per 
cent so that in the beginning of 2004 the disposable income of the consumers was almost a third 
higher than before the crisis. In the beginning of 2004 the average monthly wages of Russians were 
about 6,000 roubles (about 180 euros) (OECD 2004a). In the early part of 2005 private 
consumption rose by more than 8 per cent, which is about the same as the increase in the real 
incomes of the population (Kauppapolitiikka 2005). 
 
The development of Russian exports has also been favourable in recent years. In 2004 the value of 
exports rose to 183 billion dollars, which is 35 per cent higher than the year before. The structure of 
the total exports of Russia is still dominated by the products of the traditional, basic industrial 
sectors, which represent over three-quarters of the exports (OECD 2004). Fuels and energy alone 
still accounted for as much as 57 per cent of the exports in 2004, when the export revenue from 
crude oil increased by 48 per cent and that from oil products by 33 per cent, whereas the revenue 
from gas exports increased by only 12 per cent. The surplus in the trade balance hit a record of 88 
million dollars (BOFIT 7/2005). The countries which used to belong to the Soviet Union, the so-
called CIS countries (Confederation of Independent States) are significant trading partners of 
Russia, but the role of the European Union is also growing, especially after the most recent 
enlargement (Finpro 2004). In 2004 the largest trading partners of Russia were Germany, 
Belorussia and Ukraine (BOFIT 7/2005).  
 
The current accounts in Russia have been positive for several years. In 2004 the current accounts 
showed a surplus which represented 10 per cent of the GDP, a total of 60 billion dollars (BOFIT 
14/2005). The surplus in the current accounts is founded on the surplus of the balance of 
merchandise trade, because the balances of services have been negative and the net amounts of 
interests, profits and dividends paid abroad from Russia have also been higher. Towards the end of 
the 1990s strong devaluation of the rouble after the economic crisis also contributed to the surplus 
in the current accounts because of the decrease of imports (Finpro 2004). The favourable 
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Investments to Russia have grown rapidly in recent years. Between January and May of 2004, for 
example, investments were almost 13 per cent higher than during the same period in the previous 
year. Most of the investments are still directed to the fuel and energy sector, which accounted for 
over 30 per cent of the fixed capital investments. The degree of investments in Russia is higher than 
in, for example, the United States or European countries, but however, below the average among 
the middle and low income countries (World Bank 2004).  
 














Source: Federal State Statistics, CBR. 
 
In the Russian monetary policy there have been two main objectives which have been difficult to 
adjust to each other. Efforts have been made to curb inflation, while excessive strengthening of the 
currency has been controlled to improve competitiveness (OECD 2004a). In the past couple of 
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years the nominal exchange rate of the rouble has risen relative to the US dollar. In 2004 the rouble 
strengthened by 5 per cent relative to the dollar, but relative to the euro it weakened by almost the 
same percentage. Relative to the basket consisting of the currencies of the trade partners of Russia 
the rouble weakened by about 2 per cent. The Russian Central Bank has operated through currency 
market interventions to oppose the strengthening of the rouble. This has raised the currency reserve 
to the record high level of 125 billion dollars, which represents as much as 21 per cent of the GDP 
(BOFIT 3/2005, 14/2005). At present the currency reserve in Russia is so high that it covers the 
imports of the whole year, while a six-month currency reserve is considered reasonable for 
developing countries (Finpro 2004). The International Monetary Fund IMF has urged Russia to give 
up the policy of opposing the strengthening of the real value of the rouble, because the rate of 
inflation is likely to stay a little above 10 per cent instead of decreasing in accordance with the 
objectives (BOFIT 8/2005).   
 
Inflation, i.e. the overall increase in the prices, has slowed down clearly in the past few years. While 
in 1999 the inflation was as high as 35 per cent, by 2003 it had been reduced to 12 per cent (OECD 
2004a). However, in 2005 the rise in the consumer prices did not slow down, and Russia estimated 
that the inflation would be in the region of 10 to 11 per cent. The high export revenue flowing to the 
country is one reason for the acceleration of inflation. The Central Bank tries to restrict the 
strengthening of the rouble by purchasing currency to the reserve, but the means of the Central 
Bank are not sufficient to control the growth of the amount of roubles circulating within the 
country. In fact the inflation in Russia is accelerated due to factors which cannot be influenced 
through the monetary policy, such as rise in the world market prices for energy and high increases 
in the prices of public services determined by administrative decisions (Kauppapolitiikka 2005).  
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The state of the public economy in Russia has improved greatly after the economic crisis of 1998. 
Unlike before the crisis, the State revenue has clearly exceeded the expenditure in recent years 
(OECD 2004a). In 2004 the State economy showed a record high surplus, which represented 4.4 per 
cent of the GDP. While earlier a significant share of the budget expenditure went to the interest 
expenses on debts, now the share of these has fallen to about 8 per cent of the expenditure (BOFIT 
11/2005).  
 
As a result of the surpluses of the State economy a so-called stabilization fund was set up in Russia 
in the beginning of 2004. Its funds have increased more than expected as a result of the favourable 
development of the oil prices, and by the end of 2004 these funds totalled 522 billion roubles (over 
14 billion euros). The share of the funds exceeding 500 billion roubles was used, for example, to 
pay off foreign debts. The Russian Government estimated that in 2005 altogether 390 billion 
roubles more would be accumulated to the fund. The funds are estimated to total about 720 billion 
roubles in the beginning of 2006 (20 billion euros), which represents a little less than 4 per cent of 
the GDP (BOFIT 3/2005).  
 
2.2. …and challenges 
 
Economic development in Russia has been very positive in recent years. However, the World Bank 
(2004) identifies three major concerns relating to the current economic development in Russia. 
First, the high world market prices in the oil and natural gas sectors have focused the economic 
activity too much to these important export-oriented sectors, leading to excessive dependence on 
these key sectors. Second, efficient implementation of the economic reforms is imperative to 
maintain the rapid growth. The World Bank sees that there is a need for reform in the finance 
sector, land ownership, health care, and education. The State monopolies should be reorganised and 
the public sector should be reformed. Third, the World Bank draws attention to the governance, 
where clear distinction between the private and public sector is needed. 
 
The World Bank (2004) points out that the high growth figures of the Russian economy should be 
viewed critically. Domestic consumption and investments alone cannot ensure strong growth in the 
future, because now the growth has been supported by the high oil prices. We should also keep in 
mind that in the majority of the neighbours of Russia, i.e. the countries which have regained their 
independence (states which belonged to the former Soviet Union), the economies are growing even 
more rapidly than in Russia. The OECD (2004a) also sees certain problems in the economic 
situation in Russia. Russia is trying to diversify the structure of exports, but the comparative 
advantage enjoyed by Russia is founded on the natural resources. However, the oil resources are 
quite limited in Russia, which means other sectors to compensate for the oil should be found. 
According to the OECD, natural gas could compensate for the oil exports, because Russia has the 
greatest natural gas reserves in the world. The development of the natural gas sector is difficult due 
to the monopolised structure of ownership as well as strict regulation. Apart from the export sector, 
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the OECD sees clear development opportunities in the service sector, which could accelerate the 
growth of Russia.  
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The present production and industrial structure, which is heavily dependent on the export of natural 
resources, makes the Russian economy sensitive to changes. This is why the OECD (2004a) 
considers that the management of good fiscal and monetary policies cannot be overemphasised to 
ensure that the favourable economic development continues in Russia. The Russian Ministry for 
Economic Development and Trade estimates that maintaining the current rate of economic growth 
is difficult if it is founded on the foreign economic cycles. The Ministry has proposed extensive 
infrastructure projects, such as the construction and repair of ports, roads, airports, as well as oil and 
gas pipes. So far investments have been directed to the fuel sector, chemical and metallurgy 
industries and electricity production, while less than 10 per cent of the investments have been 
directed to machine construction (Finpro 2004). 
 
The privatisation programme of Russia has for the most part been completed, but the State of 
Russia still a significant owner in, for example, the energy and communications sectors and banks. 
In some cases the ministries responsible for certain sectors have delayed the privatisation process, 
but there have also been difficulties in defining the value of the enterprises to be sold (Finpro 2004). 
However, the reforms of the structures of the Russian economy have been slow. For example, the 
major organisational reform of the State administration started in spring 2004 caused difficulties in 
the activity of the Ministries and agencies and institutes under these, but it seems that the objectives 
set for the reform will not be reached. The clarification of the structures and division of 
responsibilities in the public sector is also still under way, and the privatisation and reform of the 
companies were still far from completed in 2004 (Bofit 1/2005).  
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The protection of investments and ownership is still insufficient in Russia, and the foreign 
investment clearly suffers from this. According to the Russian Central Bank, the value of the direct 
investments to Russia totalled 1.1 billion dollars in 2003, while the value of the investments to 
Estonia was only a fifth smaller, 0.9 billion dollars (Finpro 2004, World Bank 2004). According to 
the State Statistical Bureau (Goskomstat), however, the value of the foreign investments which 
flowed to Russia in 2003 was 6.8 billion dollars. One reason for the difference in the statistics is the 
fact that the Statistical Bureau reports the direct investments to Russia as gross amounts, i.e. the 
investments placed abroad have not been deducted from these, while the balance of payments 
statistics of the Central Bank give the net amounts of the investment flows (Lainela 2004). Direct 
foreign investments increased clearly in 2004 and they rose to 9.4 billion dollars, which is 39 per 
cent higher than the year before. Of the total investments about a half were directed to the industrial 
sector, half of these to the fuel industry. The largest foreign investments came from Luxembourg, 
Great Britain and Cyprus. It is worth noticing that investments from Cyprus are mostly originated 
from Russian investors (BOFIT 10/2005).  
 
In recent years imports to Russia have grown at least on the same pace as the disposable income. As 
the standard of living is rising thanks to the economic growth, it seems inevitable that the strong 
growth in the import demand will continue as well. The strengthening of the currency contributes to 
the increase in the import demand. At present the surplus in the current accounts is considerable, 
partly due to the current price relations, but the OECD (2004a) estimates that, if the growth of 
imports in dollars continues at the current pace while exports grow by a moderate five per cent, the 
surplus in the current accounts will melt away quite rapidly. 
 
In 2004 the average increase in the real income of the Russian population was more than 8 per cent. 
The real income of the decile with the highest income rose by 12 per cent, while those of the lowest 
income decile rose by only 6 per cent. The number of people below the poverty level decreased 
from one fifth to 18 per cent in 2004. On average, however, the poorest people are poorer than 
before (BOFIT 9/2005). The increased earnings and incomes have led to a clear reduction in 
poverty in Russia, and the decrease in the rate of unemployment to about 9 per cent in 2003 also 
contributed to this development (OECD 2004a). The income disparities between the rich and poor 
have increased considerably in the past decade. While in 1991 the Gin coefficient was 0.26 
(indicating equal income distribution, the smaller coefficient the more equal incomes), in 2004 it 
was as high as 0.4.  
 
State employees earn only 2,000 roubles a month (about 60 euros) and the economic growth has not 
managed to abolish the class of the so-called working poor, which mainly consists of young adults. 
Average Russians consider that their economic situation had improved in recent years, and the 
consumer confidence was also reflected in the increased consumption (OECD 2004a). Even if the 
consumption has increased the most in the poorest social classes, matters which are not purely 
economic, such as exclusion from health care and education, have become increasingly acute 
problems (World Bank 2004). 
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The risks of the Russian economy do not concern only the dependence of the production on few key 
sectors or fluctuations in oil prices. Corruption is still common in Russia, and the country had the 
questionable honour of being ranked number 86 on a list of altogether 133 countries, placing it 
among the most corrupt countries. In this ranking Finland was the first among the least corrupt 
countries of the world (Finpro 2004).  According to the Prosecutor General of Russia Vladimir 
Ustinov, for example, the number of crimes involving corruption increased by a fifth between 2003 
and 2004, while the number of other crimes increased by only 5 per cent. The Prosecutor General 
urged Russia to reform the legislation to comply with the conventions of the United Nations and 
Council of Europe in order to get corruption better under control and to break one important 
obstacle to the economic growth (BOFIT 6/2005).  
 
The connection between democracy and market economy is often emphasised in the efforts to 
achieve a balanced progress of the economy. The central position of the so-called oligarchs in the 
Russian economy slows down the economic reforms as well as the democratisation of the country. 
The Russian oligarchs control the companies operating in the natural resources sector, which are 
highly concentrated. However, the companies owned by the oligarchs are more efficient than the 
companies owned by other Russians. A typical problem in countries that are trying to give up 
centrally managed governance is that the democratisation of the political system remains half-
finished, which means that they end up in the middle of a one-party and multi-party system. Russia 
seems to form no exception to this. Political democracy usually increases after the liberalisation of 
the finance sector, facilitation of competition policy and market access and evolvement of the 
middle class. Among the priorities of the oligarchs and political bureaucrats these matters do not 
rank very high (Guriev & Rachinsky 2005). Without a significant middle class, there can be no 
extensive consumer society in Russia. 
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3.   STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE AND FOOD MARKET 
 
The reform of the Russian agricultural sector, which got started a little over a decade ago, is still 
under way. The collapse of the Soviet Union and abolition of the socialist system in 1991 caused 
great changes in the agricultural sector as well. The reforms initiated in 1992 also signified the 
privatisation of agricultural land and farms. The employees of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and 
pensioners had the opportunity to purchase agricultural land. No specific pieces of land were 
allocated, but the people received the option to purchase land in a certain region should they wish to 
do so. Between 1992 and 1994 altogether 12 million of such shares (options) were allocated. About 
300,000 household took advantage of the opportunity to leave farm enterprises and start family 
farming on holdings of their own, while the rest of the rural employees continued to work in the 
farm enterprises. In most cases the latter relinquished their land (option) to the farm enterprises 
through a so-called leasing system. (Serova 2005).  
 
Another significant change in the agricultural and food sector was the liberalisation of the prices 
and significant reduction in price supports. The support paid for foodstuffs, which used to represent 
as much as 60-80 per cent of the retail price, decreased considerably. For the consumers this meant 
higher food prices, which led to a clear decrease in the demand for food. The liberalisation of the 
prices also led to an increase in input prices, which during the planned economy used to be lower 
than the world market prices. Because in the early parts of the 1990s the market structures of the 
Russian agriculture and food sector were still undeveloped, the agriculture sector ran into recession. 
During the planned economy the State steered the whole food chain, but in the early stages of the 
market economy a corresponding, functioning chain simply did not exist, which means that it was 
difficult for the producers to get their products to the market. This opened the gates to food imports, 
which rose to a very high level in the early years of the market economy (Serova 2005).    
 
In the early 1990s it was believed that the privatisation of agriculture and abolition of support would 
lead to a reduction in the production and increased productivity. Production decreased after the 
reforms but productivity did not rise as expected. In most production sectors the decrease in the 
production did not stop until at the end of the past decade (Osborne et al. 2002). There are several 
reasons for the slow recovery of the Russian agriculture sector. First of all, already during the 
Soviet era agriculture used to be the Achilles heel of the economy, and compared to the other 
sectors its transition to the market economy made slow progress. Second, the profitability and 
productivity of the agriculture sector is weak, and thus it has not managed to attract capital and 
skilled labour. Because of this the technology is behind the times and the business management 
skills are also deficient. The interpretation of legal matters (e.g. relating to land ownership) is still 
ambiguous while the rural areas have suffered from social problems, which is why agriculture has 
not reached the same kind of growth as the other sectors of the economy (Hockmann & Kopsidis 
2005).   
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One of the greatest problems faced by Russian agriculture is the slow progress of the structural 
reforms. A large number of farms are making losses and agriculture still employs too large a 
number of workers whose labour input is quite modest. Farms are still kept going through artificial 
means (the State does not collect its receivables), which leads to low work motivation and takes 
resources away from more profitable work. The outdated machinery and implements make it 
impossible to improve the production efficiency and the need for investments is great. The self-
sufficiency thinking disturbs a sensible specialisation between the regions because all regions still 
strive to produce all the agricultural products they need by themselves. The markets for agricultural 
products and land cannot transmit current information to the potential buyers and sellers. Problems 
relating to the economy in general include the deficient infrastructure and undeveloped financing 
market (Tekoniemi 2003). 
 
Russian agriculture began to grow towards the end of the 1990s. Between 2000 and 2002 the 
average growth in agricultural production and capital investments in agriculture was about 6 per 
cent. General economic development was picking up and the competitiveness of Russia was 
improving, but in addition to this the growth in agriculture was supported by favourable weather 
conditions. The cultivation area was no longer decreasing and there was some improvement in 
productivity as well. The economic crisis in 1998 gave a significant impulse to the recovery of 
domestic production as imported goods became very expensive for the consumers. Later on the 
growth was supported by the legislative reforms and development of the leasing and credit systems 
for agriculture. The Russian Minister of Agriculture Alexei Gordeyev has estimated that in the past 
five years the share of unprofitable farms has fallen from 88 to 33 per cent. The Government has 
reorganised the loans of farm enterprises for the total of 60 billion roubles. The Minister admitted, 
however, that the permanent poverty of the rural areas is a persistent problem which is yet to be 
solved (East Europe 12/2005). 
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Figure 8 describes the structure of farms in Russia, and Figure 9 shows the shares of different types 
of farms in agricultural production in 2000. Large farm enterprises possess over 85 per cent of the 
agricultural land in Russia. Individual farmers own 8 per cent of the farming land and 6 per cent 
belongs to households. The large farm enterprises are former kolkhozes and sovkhozes. They differ 
from each other a great deal, and usually they specialise in the cultivation grains, oilseed crops and 
sugar beets. These farm enterprises account for about 90 per cent of the total production of these 
crops in Russia (Serova 2005).  
 








Source: Serova 2005. 
 
When the production of the different types of farms is compared to the value of agricultural 
production, the share of households becomes quite high. In 2003 households represented over a half 
of the value of agricultural production, while large farm enterprises, which possess by far the largest 
share of the land, account for only 40 per cent of the value of agricultural production. The high 
production volumes of the plots cultivated for household needs is partly a result of the economic 
crisis, but it also indicates the insufficient market economy in this sector. One reason why the 
production of household plots seems higher than it is in reality is the fact that grain prices have risen 
much more slowly than the prices of livestock products, and the production is very unevenly 
distributed between the farms. Large farms cultivate mainly grains, while households also raise 
livestock and cultivate fruits and vegetables (Serova 2005).  
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Source: Serova 2005. 
 
In recent years there has been a rapid, quite fundamental change in the principles for developing 
agricultural production. Family farm is no longer considered the model to be pursued, like in the 
early stages of the agricultural reform, but the objective is to set up large, commercial farm 
enterprises. So-called agroholding companies have been created in the agricultural sector, which 
may consist of a single farm enterprise or even tens of farms. In most cases these agroholdings 
belong to some even larger industrial-economic grouping, such as the Alfa group, Interros, Lukoil, 
Metalinvest or Rusagro. Apart from the economic business objectives the agroholding companies 
sometimes have certain other objectives, like ensuring the raw material supply of the other 
companies in the group, improving the stability of the company by diversifying its activity, or 
ensuring the supply of foodstuffs for the company’s employees. The average sales of an 
agroholding company total about 20 million dollars, while the sales per a single farm enterprise 
total about 2 million dollars (Serova 2005).   
 
The future of the Russian agriculture sector depends largely on the development of the largest farm 
enterprises, which cultivate several thousands of hectares. If the production of these farms reaches a 
favourable development path, Russia may become a globally significant actor in the agriculture 
sector (Hockman & Kopsidis 2005). 
 
In 2003 agriculture produced 5.2 per cent of the gross domestic product of Russia. The value of 
fixed capital of agriculture totalled about 1.2 trillion roubles (about 40 billion dollars), which 
represents 4.4 per cent of the total fixed assets of the Russian economy (Finpro 2004). The total 
agricultural land area in Russia is about 216 million hectares, which represents 12.5 per cent of the 
surface area of the country. The cultivated area is about 123 million hectares, which is clearly larger 
than the total cultivated are in the EU-15, but smaller than the cultivated area in the United States. 
The area under cultivation has been on the decrease, which means that there is potential to increase 
the production (Finpro 2004). The transition from the planned economy to market economy has 
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reduced the agricultural labour force by about a fifth. On the largest farms the number of farm 
workers has fallen by 60 per cent (Liefert et al. 2005). Agriculture and the food industry employ 
about 15 million people, which is about 15 per cent of the labour force. In addition to this, it is 
estimated that about 23.5 million people grow agricultural products for their own use (Finpro 2004).  
 
Table 2. Comparison of the Russian, EU-15 and US agricultural sectors in 2002.  
Agricultural Area 
(1 000 ha)




Russia 216 651 123 465 15 271
EU-15 140 987 74 124 16 401
USA 411 863 176 018 6 303  
Source: FAO. 
 
Serious efforts are being made to develop agricultural production in Russia. The objectives of the 
economic programme for 2003-2005 include the improvement of the quality and competitiveness of 
agricultural production, promoting exports and protection of the domestic food economy by means 
of customs policy. According to the programme, during the following decade Russia should reach 
self-sufficiency in the production of milk and milk products, grains, poultry meat, vegetables and 
potatoes. However, the programme does not specify the products to which the Russian export sector 
should focus in the future (Tekoniemi 2003).  
 
The development programme for agriculture emphasises the importance of establishing market 
conditions for agriculture and development of large farms through vertical integration. Large 
enterprises, which mainly operate in other sectors, have indeed invested in agriculture with the aim 
of creating a watertight vertical operating chain that they can control from the farms to the retail 
trade. Such unbroken chains of production and distribution are highly important in countries like 
Russia, where the production and distribution stages of agriculture are still quite undeveloped. In 
the economic programme for Russia until 2010 the preconditions for efficient agriculture include 
the development of private ownership and equal competition. To promote equal competition efforts 
are made to liberalise the trade flows between regions. The export of agricultural products is 
supported and protectionist measures are taken ”within reason”. 
 
Increasing agricultural production and reaching self-sufficiency in certain products in Russia are 
highly ambitious objectives. Reaching them also depends on the functioning of the input market, 
issues relating to land ownership and support policy.  
 
The agricultural input sector of Russia suffers from certain structural problems. Various kinds of 
support programmes, both national and regional, intended to support the farmers in their input 
purchases inhibit the free functioning of the input market. To receive the support the farmers must 
select the fertilisers, agricultural machines, etc. from a narrower supply. However, as the State no 
longer operates directly as an input supplier, new channels for purchasing the inputs are finding 
their way to the farmers. The functioning of the market is not too efficient as yet, which has 
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contributed to the creation of the vertical integration in the Russian agricultural and food sector. In 
addition to the structural problems the farmers suffer from lack of resources, which makes it 
difficult for them to purchase feed, fertilisers and seed. This is why Russian agriculture is still quite 
extensive as less expensive production factors, i.e. land and labour, are used to substitute for the 
more costly production factors (Serova & Shick 2005).  
 
There is an urgent need for machinery and implements in Russian agriculture. The number of 
agricultural machines and implements has decreased since the early 1990s, because the financing 
problems have prevented farms from renewing their equipment. The situation is facilitated by the 
financing aid granted by the State and leasing arrangements. The level of machinery from tractors to 
working machines is insufficient both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the past 15 years the level 
of machinery has fallen to a half: the number of tractors is only 46 per cent and that of sowing 
machines only 41 per cent of their number in 1990. In 2004 there were 564,000 tractors in Russia, 
while in 2001 there number was still about 800,000. Because now over 70 per cent of the tractors 
are more than 10 years old, according to expert estimates Russia is soon going to need about 
700,000 tractors and at least 100,000 combine harvesters. The Russian manufacturers of agricultural 
machinery will not be capable of responding to this need even quantitatively (Finpro 2005). The 
agricultural input industry is highly concentrated in Russia, i.e. both the manufacture and sale of 
input products are in the hands of a few companies. For example, the five largest manufacturers of 
tractors hold an almost 90 per cent market share, while Rosagrosnad accounts for as much as 75 per 
cent of the sales of agricultural machinery. The channels for purchasing inputs have changed. The 
agroholding companies, for example, obtain inputs from their mother companies, i.e. mainly 
commercial holding firms whose business strategy comprises agriculture as well (Serova & Shick 
2005). 
 
The shortages in the manufacture of domestic implements is compensated for through imports. In 
2004 agricultural machinery worth more than 600 million dollars were imported to Russia. In 
reality, however, the value of imports is estimated to be about a third higher, because the customs 
clearances do not tell the whole truth. Of the imported agricultural machinery 44 per cent came 
from Germany. Some foreign manufacturers have also started production in Russia. Because of the 
financing problems the demand for machinery is still smaller than the need and especially small 
farms have difficulties in obtaining bank loans. Instead, it is much easier for the large farms to 
obtain funding from abroad (Finpro 2005).  
 
The use of fertilisers decreased dramatically when Russia shifted to the market economy. The rise 
in the prices of fertilisers and lack of financial resources reduced the use of fertilisers by as much as 
85 per cent between 1990 and 2002. However, as a positive consequence of the higher input prices 
the inputs started to be used more efficiently than before. Unlike during the old regime, for 
example, all fertilisers purchased to the farms are actually being used. The use of agricultural 
machinery has also changed. Earlier the farms had all the necessary machines, but now contracting 
services are increasingly common in, for example, harvesting (Serova & Shick 2005). 
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The clarification of the ownership of agricultural land in Russia and legislative reform pose great 
challenges to the Russian agricultural sector. The impacts of the land reform adopted in October 
2001 were for the most part only symbolic, because the reform concerned only 5 per cent of the 
land area of Russia, while agricultural land was completely excluded. The foundation for the buying 
and selling market of agricultural land was laid by an act adopted in July 2002 (entered into force 
on 24 January 2003). The act regulates the legal relationships concerning the possession, use and 
exchange of agricultural land and allows, for the first time since 1917, the sale of agricultural land 
to private owners. Foreign operators were still denied the right to own agricultural land in Russia, 
but they can lease land for the maximum period of 49 years. The new act also gave the farmers the 
right to use land as security for credit (Finpro 2004, OECD 2004). 
 
Table 3.   Most important agricultural production regions in Russia in 2002. (See map of 
















Russia total 1029,3  
Source: Regiony Rossii 2003(Goskomstat) 
 
In practice agricultural trade is highly dependent on the policy practised by the central government 
and the supports available to agriculture. The new act grants the regional authorities a great deal of 
jurisdiction regarding the implementation of the act, including the right to restrict the maximum 
surface area of privately owned agricultural land within one administrative district. Because of their 
extensive powers the regional authorities may control the agricultural land market, for example, by 
postponing land sales and creating various kinds of bureaucratic barriers. At present the risks 
involved in land ownership are still great, which is why most farmers prefer to lease the land they 
need. 
 
The value of the supports allocated to agriculture through the budgets represents only one per cent 
of the gross domestic product of Russia. This is much less than in the other countries. According to 
the Russian Minister of Agriculture, Russia supports her production by about 10 dollars per hectare, 
which is only a fraction of the amount of support paid in the EU (East Europe 4/2004).  The main 
problem in Russia is that most of the State assistance (sometimes as much as 80 per cent) goes to 
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the administrative bodies involved in the agricultural sector, not for supporting the agricultural 
enterprises. The Russian Government is planning to raise agricultural supports and has also told 
about this in the context of the WTO negotiations. One special strength of Russian agriculture is 
that it has shown its ability to survive without State assistance (Finpro 2004).  
 
The production potential of the Russian agricultural sector is great, but the quite optimistic forecasts 
of the productivity growth have not been realised as yet. The following chapters take a closer look 
at the situation in different production sectors.  
 




At present Russia produces much less milk than 15 years ago. Towards the end of the 1990s the 
sector recovered to some extent from the collapse in the beginning of the decade, but since then the 
trend has not been as positive. The productivity of dairy farms is still weak, while hardly any 
investments needed to develop the production are being made. During the Soviet era milk 
production was the leading production sector of agriculture, with an annual production of 55 million 
tonnes. In 2003 the production totalled only 32 million tonnes and it was estimated to decrease 
further in 2004. One obvious reason for the decrease in milk production is the reduction in the 
number of dairy cows to about half from that in 1990 (now about 22 million). For example, in 2003 
the number of cattle fell by 4 per cent because of the poor grain crop, which lead to a shortage of 
feed and increased slaughtering of animals (Agra Europe 2.4.2004). 
 
The variation in the milk production costs is great in Russia, from 159 to 831 roubles per 100 kg. 
The variation is caused by differences in the labour, feed and capital costs as well as in the 
productivity of the cows and technology used (Mokshina 2005). Today there are two very different 
kinds of dairy farms in Russia. A smaller share of the farms are highly dynamic and possess the 
economic potential to introduce new production technology, while for the majority of farms it is 
quite impossible to make such investments. Foreign companies have contributed to the development 
of the dynamic farms to ensure that the milk they produce meet the quality requirements of dairies. 
In practice the assistance has meant, for example, the acquisition of cold tanks to the farms, and the 
investment costs have been repaid through the milk supplied. These kinds of investments have 
made a significant contribution to improving the quality of milk. For example, in the Dutch dairy 
company Campina the share of the milk of the highest quality grade of the total production in 
Russia has risen from 6 to 55 per cent in the past four years (Dries et al. 2004). However, the 
dynamics in the Russian dairy sector created by the foreign companies is regionally very limited, 
because most of these companies are located in the Moscow and St Petersburg regions, which are 
very different from the other Russian regions (Dries et al. 2004). 
 
  21 
Half of the milk produced in Russia still comes from remote private farms, whose milk does not in 
most cases qualify for industrial processing. It is estimated that less than 15 per cent of the milk 
produced by small private farms is sold for further processing (Dries et al. 2004). Instead, most of 
the milk produced on the largest farms is used for processing. This kind of milk represents about 47 
per cent of the total milk production in Russia (Agra Europe 2.4.2004). The average yield of cows is 
very low, less than 3,000 kg, while in the EU-15 the average yield is clearly above 6,000 kg. 
However, there is also higher-yielding animal material in Russia, but the differences between the 
production animals are great.  
 

















Raw milk production Deliveries of milk to dairies
 
Source: ZMP 2004, PTT. 
 
The dairy industry is highly concentrated in Russia. Milk processors located in Moscow and St 
Petersburg alone produce over 60 per cent of the total value of the production of milk products. 
Large corporate farms are concentrated to the Moscow region, because this is where financers for 
the investments can be found. However, the city of Moscow and the Moscow region cannot produce 
enough milk, but it must be brought from the other regions. The regional producers are very much 
willing to market their milk to the processors in Moscow because of the more favourable sales 
terms (Mokshina 2005). The concentration to the Moscow region has also tightened the competition 
and quite high prices are being paid for high-quality milk. The price of normal quality milk is about 
18.40 cents/litre, while as much as 28.30 cents/litre may be paid for milk that is rated to the highest 
quality class. Because of the high prices many companies have started to purchase milk at distances 
as long as 1,500 kilometres. The rise in the producer prices has created great expectations among 
the producers, but any further improvement in the paying capacity in the future seems unlikely. The 
packaging and wage costs of the dairy industry are on the increase, but the consumer prices are no 
longer rising very much (Agra Europe 2.4.2004). Table 4 shows that without the quality 
supplements the price of raw milk would still be clearly below the price level in the EU-15.  
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Table 4.    Price of milk in Russia, EU-15 and Finland. 
Producer milk 
prices, €/100 kg  2002 2003
Russia 14,8 13,3*
EU-15 29,7 28,6
Finland 35,5 35,3  
Source: ZMP 2004, PTT. (*The figure for Russia in 2003 is preliminary information.) 
 
The USDA forecasts that in 2005 milk production in Russia will remain on about the same level as 
in 2004. The same applies to the production of cheese and butter (Agra Europe 26.11.2004). 
International estimates of the development of the Russian milk production differ from each other to 
some extent. According to the ZMP, milk production is going to decrease in the future, which 
would cause problems to milk processors as well, because they cannot transfer to growing 
production costs to the consumers. The problems would affect especially the small and medium-
sized milk processors, because the producers sell high-quality milk only to dairies which are 
capable of paying a higher price for it (Agra Europe 2.4.2004). Instead, according to forecasts by 
the OECD (2005) and FAPRI (2005), by 2013 milk production in Russia is going to increase from 
the present level by about 10 per cent. Only 55 per cent of the total production would end up in 
dairies, while at present a little less than half of the total milk production is delivered to dairies. This 
share is very low compared to the EU countries. Figure 11 presents the forecast of the OECD and 
FAPRI concerning the change in milk production by 2013. The forecast of FAPRI concerning 
butter production is slightly more optimistic than that of the OECD, but butter production should 
rise by about 10 per cent in ten years. The difference in the forecasts for cheese production is 
greater: according to FAPRI (2005) it should rise by about 15 per cent, while the OECD estimates 
the increase at only 8 per cent.   
 

























Source: OECD 2005, FAPRI 2005. 
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Consumption 
 
The value of the Russian milk product market is estimated at 22-25 billion dollars annually 
(AgraFood 4/2004). Compared to the Soviet era the consumption of milk products has decreased 
clearly. In 2002 and 2003 the consumption of milk products in Russia was about 225 kg per capita, 
while in 1990 it was 360 kg. Thus there is a great deal of growth potential on the Russian milk 
product market. The Russians consume, for example, the average of only 5.6 kg of cheese per capita 
per year, while in the EU-15 the average annual per capita consumption of cheese is 18.9 kg 
(Gallup Food and Farm Facts 2005). 
 
During the Soviet era the consumer basket of milk products was still very different from that in the 
western countries. In Russia the consumption consisted mainly of cheese, sour cream (smetana), 
kefir, liquid milk, milk powder and butter, while yoghurt and flavoured milk drinks were 
completely unknown. The trade of milk products took place either directly between households or 
in market booths and the like. Since then the milk trade has rapidly moved to supermarkets and the 
range of milk products has grown to 500-1,000 in supermarkets and as much as 1,000-2,000 in the 
giant hypermarket (Dries et al. 2004).  
 
The consumption of milk products is expected to rise considerably during the next decade as the 
standard of living continues to improve. For example, the FAPRI forecasts that cheese consumption 
should grow to about 590 million kg, which is 15 per cent higher than at present, while the forecast 
of the OECD is as high as 675 million kg. Butter consumption is expected to rise to about 465 
million kg, which would be 7 per cent more than at present. The consumption of powders is also 
forecast to increase 5 to 10 per cent during the next decade (FAPRI 2005, OECD 2005). 
 
























Source: FAPRI 2005. 
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Foreign trade and foreign production activity in Russia 
 
More extensive export of milk products to Russia got started during the perestroika at the turn of the 
1990s when many of the barriers to imports were lifted. A second wave in the supply of milk 
product in Russia came as a result of the economic crisis in 1998 and strong devaluation of the 
rouble in 1999. As the costs of import rose considerably and tighter border control made import 
increasingly difficult the companies decided to invest in local operations. At present about 5 per 
cent of the milk, yoghurt and other traditional milk products sold in supermarkets are imported 
products. In cheeses the share of imports is higher, 15 to 20 per cent, because the local cheese 
processing is still poorly developed and the demand for special cheeses has grown among the 
increasingly wealthy consumers (Dries et al. 2004).  
 
The import of milk products to Russia has grown as the domestic production has been decreasing. 
For example, in 2003 the cheese imports grew by more than 30 per cent and butter imports by more 
than 10 per cent (Agra Europe 2.4.2004). Milk products are imported to Russia mainly from 
Western Europe, but New Zealand is a significant butter importer. Somewhat surprisingly, 
Belorussia also exports considerable amounts of cheeses, butter and other milk products to Russia 
(Dries et al. 2004). 
 
In 2003 the cheese imports to Russia totalled 175,000 tonnes, which accounts for about a third of 
the total consumption. About 160,000 tonnes of butter was imported, which represents about 40 per 
cent of the consumption. New Zealand was the largest butter exporter to Russia with a share of 
about a third of total butter imports to Russia, and the share of the largest cheese exporter, 
Germany, was about the same (Agra Europe 26.11.2004). Figure 13 shows that the foreign trade of 
milk products in Russia still shows a clear deficit. In 2004 the value of the milk products imported 
to Russia was a little under 760 million dollars, while in 2000 it was a little less than 250 million 
dollars. In recent years the exports have grown as well, but the growth has been quite modest 
compared to imports. The dramatic growth in the import of milk products shows that the foreign 
investments in Russia have not, at least as yet, substituted for the imports. 
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Many foreign dairy companies have told about their intentions to invest significant amounts to the 
Russian dairy industry. Increasing exports has also been the goal of many dairy companies, and 
many of them have also succeeded in this. For example, the Arla Foods told that its butter and 
cheese exports to Russia had grown by more than a fifth in 2004 (Eurofood 2004). The French dairy 
company Danone plans to double its milk processing capacity in Russia by 2007. The European 
Reconstruction and Development Bank has granted 17.5 million euros for the investments in this 
capacity increase. Danone has operated in Russia since 1992 and at present it owns two dairies in 
Russia. In the beginning of 2004 Danone was the leader on the Russian milk product market with a 
market share of about 15 per cent (East Europe 9/2004). Unilever returned to the Russian ice-cream 
market in 2003 after about two years’ absence. The Russian ice-cream market is growing steadily 
and, for example, Campina set up a third production line in the Moscow region (Euro Food 
25.9.2003).  
 
The OECD (2005) forecasts that the cheese imports will be growing in spite of the recovery of the 
domestic production with the help of foreign companies. The imports are estimated to double from 
the present level by 2013, which means that the share of imports in the consumption would be a 
little less than a half. At present imported cheeses account for about a third of the consumption. 
According to the estimates by FAPRI, cheese imports will not grow quite as much, because the 
estimate for the domestic consumption is lower than that of the OECD. As the imports of milk 
products have been growing, the Russian authorities have started to consider various kinds of 
border protection measures to restrict imports. For example, in the early part of 2004 Russia 
planned to impose raised duties for imported cheeses. After negotiations with the EU it was finally 
decided that the refunds for EU exports to Russia were lowered considerably. 
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Source: OECD 2005. 
 
The estimates of the trends in butter imports differ from each other to some extent. The FAPRI 
estimates that the imports will stay at about the current level, but according to the OECD the butter 
imports may grow by as much as 70 per cent by 2014. This would mean that the share of imported 
butter in the total consumption would be 30 to 45 per cent. The imports of skimmed milk powder 
have been clearly smaller than butter and cheese imports in both absolute and relative terms. The 
FAPRI forecasts that the imports of skimmed milk powder will decrease during the next decade, 
while the OECD expects the imports to grow to some extent. The difference is again due to the 
consumption, which according to the OECD’s forecasts will grow more than according to FAPRI 
(FAPRI 2005, OECD 2005).   
 




Russian meat production has decreased considerably in recent years as the numbers of animals have 
fallen. In 2003 the number of production animals was only 40 per cent of that in 1990. The main 
factor which started the decline in livestock production in Russia was the liberalisation of the prices 
of agricultural products in 1992, where the quite significant consumption supports were abolished. 
This reduced the purchasing power of the consumers and the demand for domestic meat fell at the 
same time when the imports were growing rapidly (Serova et al. 2002). By the beginning of 2005 
the number of livestock had fallen to 23.1 million from the 24.8 million the year before. Even if the 
total number of animals has been decreasing, the number of poultry is on the increase, and there has 
been some increase in the number of pigs and sheep as well (East Europe 2/2005).  
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Source: East Europe 2/2005. 
 
The foreign and Russian estimates on the development of meat production in Russia differ 
considerably from each other. According to the quite optimistic estimate of the Russian Meat 
Union, the domestic meat production would grow by more than 40 per cent from 2003 until 2010. 
However, the meat production would still be about a quarter lower than in 1990, when it totalled 
10.1 million tonnes. The focus of meat production seems to be shifting to poultry meat. One of the 
key areas in the Russian economic programmes has been to ensure self-sufficiency in poultry meat. 
The Russian Meat Union has suggested that the import duties of all processed meats should be 
raised to ensure the full utilisation of the domestic production capacity (East Europe 4/2004).  
 























Source: OECD 2005. 
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In recent years a great deal has been invested in poultry production in Russia. The production has 
doubled in the past three years, and at the end of 2004 it was estimated that the production had 
grown by almost a fifth from the situation a year before. Apart from the high investments the 
growth has been founded on the restrictions on poultry imports, which have been successful from 
the Russian perspective. The objective is that support for the domestic production and restrictions 
on imports would triple poultry meat production by 2010 (3.23 million tonnes), which would 
represent more than 40 per cent of all meat production (22 per cent in 2003). At present pork and 
beef production volumes are still clearly higher than poultry meat production. However, the 
international estimates of the growth in poultry meat production are far more pessimistic than the 
three-fold growth by 2010 expected in Russia. According to the OECD (2005) and FAPRI (2005), 
the production should grow by about 70 per cent.  
 
The views on the development of beef production also differ from each other. According to the 
OECD (2005), in 2010 beef production will be only a little higher than in 2004, while according to 
the Russian Meat Union beef production will be about a fifth lower in 2010 than in 2003. The 
FAPRI (2005) in turn estimates that beef production is going to fall by about 15 per cent by 2014. 
 
Efforts are also being made to increase pork production in Russia. The Russian pork producer 
organisation even plans to double the production to 3.3 million tonnes by 2010. This target should 
be reached through lower production costs and by building new pig production units. The prospects 
for growth in pork production are quite positive, because the demand is growing, there is growth 
potential in the production of feed grains and import quotas restrict the pork imports (Agra Europe 
29.4.2005). However, the international estimates on the growth in pork production are not as 
optimistic. According to the FAPRI (2005) and OECD (2005), the production would rise by only 




The trends in meat consumption should be quite positive in Russia. For example, the OECD (2005) 
estimates that the consumption of all types of meat will be growing. Beef consumption is expected 
to grow by about 10 per cent and pork consumption by about a fifth by 2014, while poultry meat 
consumption should increase by almost 50 per cent. The forecast for trends in meat consumption by 
FAPRI (2005) is close to that of the OECD for the part of pork and poultry meat, but the FAPRI 
estimates that there will be some decrease in beef consumption. The FAPRI obviously expects that 
the growth in poultry meat consumption will substitute for beef.  
According to Musheg Mamimokyan, the Chairman of the Russian Meat Union, by 2010 the annual 
consumption of meat and processed meats would total about 10 million tonnes, while about 2 
million tonnes of meat would be imported. Around 2010 the distribution of meat consumption 
according to types of meat would be such that the share of poultry meat would be 45 per cent, pork 
35 per cent, beef 17 per cent and mutton 3 per cent (Pravda 2002). According to the OECD (2005), 
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however, the annual meat consumption would be only a little less than 7 500 tonnes, which is much 
lower than the estimate of the Russian Meat Union. The OECD (2005) also forecasts that poultry 
meat consumption would exceed the consumption of pork only around 2014. Thus the estimates 
presented in Russia concerning both the pace of the growth and the distribution between the types 
of meat again differ from the international estimates. 






















Source: OECD 2005. 
The changes in meat consumption are naturally influenced by the prices of the products. The 
wholesale prices for meat have risen as the meat imports have been restricted and the domestic 
production has declined. Between the autumn of 2003 and autumn 2004 the meat prices had risen 
by several tens of percentage units (East Europe, 12/2004). There are interesting differences in the 
forecasts concerning the producer prices between the different organisations. The FAPRI expects 
that the prices will rise only little or they may even decrease, but according the OECD the prices 
should rise considerably. At present the trend forecast by the OECD is closer to the truth, because 
the import barriers reduce the imports and the prices are rising. In 2005 the poultry meat prices 
should stay on about the same level as earlier because of the tight competition, but the prices of beef 
and pork are expected to rise clearly due to the obstacles to meat imports. In the early part of 2005 
the wholesale prices for pork rose by 5 to 10 per cent and the beef prices by about 2 per cent (East 
Europe 3/2005).  
Foreign trade 
 
As the domestic meat production has decreased, Russia has become the second largest net importer 
of meat in the world. Poultry meat imports are the largest in both absolute terms and relative to the 
total consumption. In 1999-2003 the annual poultry meat imports totalled, on average, 1,250 million 
kg, which represents almost 75 per cent of the total consumption. During the same period the 
average pork imports were a little less than 480 million kg, which accounts for about a quarter of 
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the total consumption. The average beef imports were a little less than 520 million kg, representing 
a little over a fifth of the domestic beef consumption (OECD 2005). In 2004 the value of Russian 
meat imports was about 2.2 billion dollars, which means that it has not yet reached the value of 
imports in 1997. In fact the value of meat imports decreased slightly between 2002 and 2003, but 
after that there has again been some increase. Figure 18 shows that Russia exports hardly any meat 
to other countries. 
 


























Russia has protected its meat sector against foreign imports by imposing import quotas for meat. 
The import quotas applied in 2004 were 447,500 tonnes for beef and 450,000 tonnes for pork, while 
for poultry meat a quota of 1.05 million tonnes was set for three years (Agra Europe 10.12.2004). 
Of the import quota for poultry meat the share of the United States was 772,000 tonnes and the 
quota for the EU was 210,000 tonnes. Towards the end of 2004 it seemed, however, that the quota 
would not be fulfilled due to administrative reasons, because in the first 11 months of the year the 
imports had decreased by almost 10 per cent from the same period in the previous year (Agra 
Europe 21.1.2005). The restrictions on poultry meat imports have made it possible for Russia to 
increase its own production. However, growth in the poultry sector began before the quota regime. 
In the poultry sector more attention will also be directed at the quality of the imported meat (Agra 
Europe 23.12.2004). 
At present Russia is negotiating on raising the meat import quotas. Restrictions on meat imports 
have caused problems in Russia, as well as in the exporting countries. As the imports decreased 
more domestic raw material had to be used in Russia, which led to a rapid reduction in the number 
of animals. This in turn led to an even more acute shortage of raw material. The use of poultry meat 
has increased as beef has been in short supply (Finpro 2004).  The future of the Russian meat 
industry depends largely on how the raw material problem can be solved. Some companies are 
trying to solve the problem on their own through vertical integration, i.e. by setting up contract 
farms of their own to secure their raw material supply. 
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The EU has suffered from the export problems due to the restrictions on meat imports to Russia. 
Russia also restricted the import of Brazilian products temporarily because of the foot-and-mouth 
disease. Brazil is the largest exporter of beef and pork to Russia (East Europe 12/2004). Russia has 
also threatened the United States and Canada by import restrictions because the conditions of 
animal transports have not been in proper order. However, in the negotiations between Russia and 
the United States concerning Russia’s membership in the WTO it was agreed that Russia is going to 
increase its import quota for meat. The import quotas for beef and poultry meat will be raised by 
about 5 per cent (Agra Europe 10.12.2004, 15.4.2005). 
 
The objectives included in the Russian agricultural programme for 2001-2010 should influence the 
meat production sector as well. During the programme period Russia strives to reach self-
sufficiency in poultry meat and eggs, among other things. The agricultural programme also stresses 
the need to improve the competitiveness of the domestic pork and meat products, which means that 
efforts are likely to be made to increase their role in exports. However, it is also possible that the 
agricultural programme refers to improving the competitiveness of the domestic pork and meat 
products relative to the foreign imports. 
 
Musheg Mamimokyan, the Chairman of the Russian Meat Union, forecasts that in 15 to 25 years 
Russia will export annually 2-3 million tonnes of meat and meat products. This estimate is founded 
on the expectation that feed grain production will stay on a high level (Pravda 2002). However, the 
international forecasts on the development of agricultural production in Russia do not support this 
estimate. According to FAPRI (2005), for example, Russia will be clearly a net importer of meat in 
the next decade. In fact, imports are not likely to decrease, as the import of beef and poultry meat 
would increase by about 13 per cent while pork imports could decrease by about the same 
percentage. The OECD’s (2005) views concerning the Russian meat market are quite similar to 
those of the FAPRI. 
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Beef and veal Pig meat Poultry meat
 
Source: FAPRI 2005. 
In the first half of 2005 meat imports to Russia increased by almost 15 per cent. The amount of 
imported mutton grew by over 70 per cent, that of beef by over 40 per cent and poultry meat by 
about a third from the previous year. Russian authorities have estimated that meat imports will be 
needed in the future as well. The import of fresh and frozen meat is expected to grow by more than 
15 per cent by 2008 compared to the import volumes in 2004 (Agra Europe 19.8.2005) 




The most important crop products in Russia are grains (mainly wheat), potato, sugar beet and 
sunflower (Finpro 2004). In the international perspective grain production is probably the most 
competitive sector of Russian agriculture. Russia has also told that it will be making serious efforts 
to promote grain production as well as grain exports. There is a great deal of potential in the 
Russian grain sector, which is also easier to realise over a shorter period of time than in, for 
example, milk or meat production. The amendment of the legislation to allow relatively free land 
sales and purchases made a significant contribution to improving the efficiency of grain production 
in Russia. Extensive vertical integration has also improved the productivity of the sector (USDA 
2004b).  
 
In recent years there has been some variation in the total grain crop in Russia. In 2004 the grain 
crop totalled 74.9 million tonnes, which was about 10 million tonnes more than the year before, 
when drought and frost damaged the crop (East Europe 2/2005). A good crop, totalling 87 million 
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tonnes, was harvested in 2002 as well. However, a couple of decades ago during the Soviet era the 
grain crops could rise to over 100 million tonnes. 
 














Wheat production Wheat exports
Production of coarse grains Exports of coarse grains  
Source: USDA. 
 
The production of oilseed crops has increased clearly in Russia in the past couple of years. The 
oilseed crop hit a new record level of 5.7 million tonnes in 2004. Oilseed crop production in Russia 
consists mainly of sunflower, which represents more than four fifths of the total production. The 
area under oilseed crops grew again in 2005, which means that the production will increase as well. 
Russia has traditionally exported some sunflower oil, and the exports were expected to double in 
2005. The growth in exports is founded on the growth in the production by almost 60 per cent 
between 2002 and 2004 (AgraFood East Europe, 4/2005, Agra Europe 8/2005).  
 
Table 5.  Production of oilseed crops in Russia (1,000 tonnes) in 2001-2004. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 Change % 2003/04
Sunseed 2 685 3 684 4 871 4 801 3
Soybean 350 423 393 555 41
Others 150 163 301 361 20
Total oilseeds 3 185 4 270 5 565 5 717 3  
Source: Agra Food East Europe 2005. 
 
The Russian Minister of Agriculture Alexei Gordeyev has told that Russia aims at a significant 
increase in grain production and exports. In the next couple of years the production should increase 
to 100-110 million tonnes from the present 76 million tonnes. This objective can be considered 
feasible, because during the Soviet era the record grain yield was as high as 127.4 million tonnes. 
Today the largest grain exporters in the world are the EU, USA, Canada, Argentina and Australia. 
Now Russia is striving to become one of the five largest grain exporters. According to international 
forecasts, however, this objective is by far too optimistic. According to forecasts by the OECD 
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(2005) and FAPRI (2005), in the next two to three years Russia will remain clearly short of the 
objective of 100 million tonnes. 
 
At present the hectare yields of grains are quite modest in Russia. For example, the average yield 
per hectare of wheat is as low as 1,600 kg and it is only expected to rise to a little less than 1,900 kg 
by 2013. In the EU-15 the average yield per hectare of wheat is at present a little under 5,800 kg 
and after 2010 it is estimated to be more than 6,000 kg. This means that there is a lot of unused 
potential in Russian wheat production. Figure 21 present a forecast of the development of wheat 
production in Russia. By 2014 this is estimated to increase by about 8 per cent, while in the EU-15 
the total wheat production would stay at about the present level (FAPRI 2005, OECD 2005). 
 





















Source: OECD 2005. 
 
Figure 22 presents the growth in the production of feed grains. The OECD (2005) estimates that in 
the EU-15 the production of feed grains would decrease slightly, but the production in Russia would 
grow by a few percentages. 
 





















Source: OECD 2005. 
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Foreign trade 
 
The high yields in 2001 and 2002 suddenly made Russia one of the most significant grain exporters 
in the world. In the market year 2002/2003 Russian grain exports were as high as 17 million tonnes, 
of which a little over 5 million tonnes went to the EU-25. In the following market year the Russian 
grain exports totalled about 7 million tonnes, about half of this wheat, and the grain exports to the 
EU-25 fell to a little over 800,000 tonnes. Because the grain crop of 2003 was weaker than the 
average, the Russian Government imposed an export fee of 25 euros per tonne as of January 2004. 
This export fee was collected until the end of April 2004. The purpose of this temporary measure 
was to balance the prices of bread and bakery products in Russia (East Europe 2/2005, Agra Europe 
10/2004, Bank of Finland 2004). However, in practise export tariffs have not stopped growth of the 
grain prices.  
 
The Russian Ministry of Agriculture estimates that in market year 2004/2005 Russia exported 8 to 
10 million tonnes of grains (East Europe 2/2005). The Minister of Agriculture Alexei Gordeyev has 
told that by 2010 the annual grain exports should total 13 million tonnes (Agra Europe 3.12.2004). 
However, the international forecasts on the development of the Russian grain exports do not 
indicate that this objective could be reached. According to the USDA (2004b), there is a lot of 
unused potential in Russia, but much depends on the rise in the productivity. Table 6 shows a basic 
scenario which corresponds to the average of grain exports in 1999-2001. The table also shows the 
impact of weak and rapid productivity growth on grain exports in 2013. If the productivity of grain 
production remains low, Russia could again become a net importer of grains by a narrow margin. If 
the productivity improved rapidly, Russia could become a significant grain exporter (USDA 
2004b).  
 
Table 6. Development of Russian grain production and exports in scenarios of low and high 







Production 66 74 87
Net exports -1,2 -0,6 15,5  
Source: USDA. 
 
The OECD (2005) forecasts a moderate growth in wheat exports. In fact the forecast for net exports 
in market year 2014/15 (7.2 million tonnes) is slightly lower than Russia’s own estimate for market 
year 2004/05. The forecast by FAPRI (2005) is quite similar to that of the OECD. If the Russian 
wheat exports grew at the pace forecast by the OECD and FAPRI, the EU would stay clearly ahead 
of Russia in the export volumes of wheat trade. For comparison, it should be noted that, according 
to a forecast by FAPRI, the world’s largest wheat exporter the United States would export about 26 
million tonnes of wheat in market year 2013/14, which is slightly less than at present. For the part 
of feed grains Russia would be close to self-sufficiency in a little less than a decade. Barley exports 
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would more than double from the present volumes. The net exports of oilseed crops would almost 
double as well. Instead, the OECD (2005) estimates that Russia would become a net importer of 
feed grains by a narrow margin. 
 
Table 7. Current situation in the Russian and EU-15 grain exports and forecast (million tonnes). 
2004/05 2013/14 Change 2004/13
Wheat
Russia: Net exports 4,5 5,7 27 %
EU-25: Net exports 10,9 11,2 3 %
Barley
Russia: Net exports 1,3 2,9 123 %
EU-15: Net exports 3,1 3,8 23 %  
Source: Fapri. 
 
Development of farming technology and renewal of the machinery and implements could make 
Russia one of the leading grain exporters in the world. Vertical integration improves the efficiency 
of the food chain and investments of farming corporations increase the yields per hectare. However, 
in the future the Russian grain exports will be restricted by the tightening competition on the 
international market and increased domestic consumption. The underdeveloped infrastructure, 
especially the insufficient capacity of harbours and railroads, causes problems for exports. The 
quality of the grain may also be a problem, because the varieties grown in Russia differ from those 
in, for example, the United States. Lower quality influences the price obtained for the grain as well 
as the demand. The yields vary a great deal and regional and seasonal price fluctuations are 
remarkable. The domestic purchasing power of grains is weak in the livestock sector and the State's 
export policy has been inconsistent. Grain exports also suffer from the restrictions on grain imports 
imposed by several countries and groups of countries (e.g. EU) (East Europe 11/2004, Tekoniemi 
2003). However, grain exports from Russia to the EU will increase in the next few years, because in 
2004 the EU and Russia signed an agreement on raising the export quota of Russia in the context of 
the EU enlargement. In 2003 the Russian quota was 600,000 tonnes, but in that year the quota was 
quite inutile for Russia because exporting to other countries was far more profitable (East Europe 
5/2004). 
 
3.4 Russian food sector 
 
Russia is one of the largest food importers in the world and it has become a significant, growing 
market area for food exporters. The rapid economic growth in recent years and the increase in the 
real incomes of the consumers have led to a rapid increase in food imports. Russia's own food 
industry has also recovered in recent years thanks to foreign investments. At present the production 
of the Russian food industry is well on the increase. Between 2003 and 2004 it grew by a little more 
than 5 per cent. Food industry has been capable of competing with foreign imports even better than 
the other industrial sectors (Finpro 2004, World Bank 2004).  
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Food imports collapsed in 1998 as a result of the economic crisis in Russia. This had two significant 
consequences. First, the domestic food industry, which up to then had not been very successful, got 
the very welcome stimulus as the consumers who had got used to the foreign products had to shift 
back to the domestic supply. The domestic companies in the brewing, dairy and fruit juices 
industries gained a significant market share, and they have also managed to hold on to this. 
Secondly, the foreign companies started to buy local companies at reasonable prices to open up the 
sales channels to the Russian market. High investments have been made to the Russian food 
industry in recent years. Machinery and implements have been modernised and the quality of the 
products has improved. Local food companies which have managed to attract investments have 
developed the quality of their production and differentiated their products (USDA 2004c).  
 
















The share of raw materials is particularly high in Russian exports, while in the imports the share of 
processed and high technology products is still large. As the domestic production in Russia has 
recovered the proportional share of foodstuffs in total imports has decreased, but in 2002 it was still 
22.5 per cent (Finpro 2003). In 2004, when the total imports to Russia rose to a record high level, 
the share of foodstuffs in total imports fell to about 13 per cent. Foodstuffs constitute the second 
largest group of import articles after machinery and implements. The Moscow and St Petersburg 
regions import more than half of their foodstuffs from abroad (ERS/USDA 2001).  
 
The demand for foodstuffs is expected to increase in Russia in the next couple of years as the 
disposable income of the consumers is rising and consumer habits are approaching those prevailing 
in Western Europe. The consumption of meat, milk, fruits and vegetables is expected to grow in the 
near future. The consumption of certain products, such as beer, is already close to the consumption 
level in the western countries. The demand for processed and convenience foods, for example, 
premixed salads, processed and vacuum-packed fish and noodles will be growing as well (USDA 
2004a). 
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Table 8.  Forecast of the development of the food and drink market in Russia. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Food consumption per capita kg/year
Meat 49,2 51,1 52,7 54,1 55,7 57,2
Milk 155,7 159,8 163,2 166,1 169,2 172,2
Fruits 41,9 43 43,9 44,7 45,5 46,2
Vegetables 94,7 96,5 97,9 99,2 100,3 101,9
Coffee 2,2 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,4
Tee 1,1 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2
Total consumption, billion litres
Alcohol beverages 9,9 10,2 10,5 10,7 10,9 11,2
Soft drinks 4,6 4,9 5,2 5,4 5,7 5,9
Confectioners (tons) 2 147 2 210 2 272 2 343 2 415 2 485  
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
The disposal income of the Russian consumers has increased rapidly during the past decade. About 
10 years ago the average disposable monthly income of the consumers was only 20 to 30 dollars, 
but since then it has risen ten-fold to about 300 dollars a month. The consumer expenditure on 
foodstuffs has also grown. The food sector is estimated to grow very strongly in the next decade. 
The monthly expenditure on food and drink is expected to almost double from the present 70 dollars 
to 130 dollars by 2012, while the turnover of the sector increases from the present 130 billion 
dollars to 220 billion dollars (Finpro 2004). 
Figure 24. Consumer expenditure on food, drink and tobacco (the scale on the left) and share of 























Expeditures of food, beverages and tobacco
Share of food of total expenditures
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
 
The growth in the disposable income of the consumers is estimated to benefit especially the retail 
traders and food manufacturers. According to the Katchalov & Partners market research institute, 
each of the following groups represents 15 per cent of the expenditure on foodstuffs: confectionary, 
alcoholic beverages and fresh meat, while the share of milk products, sausages and other meat 
products, vegetables and fruits is about 8 per cent each. The market research institute estimates that 
the period of strong growth in Moscow should slow down around 2012-2014, when the average 
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monthly expenditure on foodstuffs will be about 350 dollars per capita. In the whole country the 
consumption is not likely to slow down until 2022-2024, and the average monthly expenditure on 
food would be 240-280 dollars (Finpro 2004).  
 
3.4.1 Food production in Russia  
 
Even if Russia is not self-sufficient in foodstuffs, the Russian food industry is a dynamic and 
growing sector. The value of food production almost doubled between 1999 and 2002, when it was 
close to 26 billion dollars. During the same period the net profit of the sector rose by 50 per cent. 
The growth has been particularly strong in the dairy and brewing industry, confectionary industry 
and production of various kinds of sauces. The growing purchasing power of the consumers and 
increased consumption of the higher quality products have led to a rapid growth in direct 
investments in the food sector. For example, in the first six months of 2003 the investments grew by 
63 per cent more than during the same period in the previous year (USDA 2004a). 
 
Table 9.  Indicators for the development of the food industry in Russia. 
1999 2000 2001 2002 Change 
% 01/02
Number of businesses (thousands) 22,9 25,4 24,7 23,3 -5,7
Value of food production (billion US$) 14,6 18,7 22,8 25,9 13,6
Net profit (billion US$) 1 1,2 1,5 1,5
Bread/bakery products (million tons) 9,2 9 8,6 8,3 -3,5
Pasta products (thousands tons) 707 704 764 831 8,8
Confectionery (thousand tons) 1509 1628 1793 1952 8,9
Meat, incl. offals(thousand tons) 1113 1193 1284 1390 8,3
Sausages (thousand tons) 948 1052 1224 1443 17,9
Dairy products (million tons) 5,6 62 6,7 7,5 11,9
Canned/preserved foods (million tons)
* vegetables, ex. Juices or tomato prod 322 386 417 489 17,3
* fruit juice 340 705 1419 2199 55
* fruits and berries 193 114 118 153 29,7
* dairy products 538 620 677 714 5,5
* canned fish/seafood 486 531 610 598 -2
Mineral water (million deceliters) 74 98 122 157 28,7
Wine, grape (million decaliters) 18 24 27 32 18,4
Beer (million decaliters 445 516 637 702 10,2  
Source: Goskomstat. 
 
According to a study carried out by the Expert RA in autumn 2004, there are as many as 48 food 
companies among the 400 largest companies in Russia. The largest one was Wimm-Bill-Dann, 
which with the sales of about 940 million dollars held the 38th position.  The second largest food 
company was the Baltika brewery (sales about 735 million dollars), the third largest was the 
agroholding company Razguljai-Ukros (sales about 675 million dollars) and the fourth largest was 
agricultural company Karavaj Pljus (sales about 665 million). These are all among the 50 largest 
companies in Russia (Finpro 2005).   
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The development of the Russian food sector can be summed up into a few main trends. First of all, 
the vertical integration is proceeding rapidly and new large agricultural and food sector companies 
are being set up. Vertical integration increases in all production sectors. Second, agricultural 
production grows and develops, albeit slowly. It is going to take years before the local farms can 
produce at least most of the inputs needed in the local food processing industry. Third, foreign 
companies continue to invest in Russia. Fourth, reorganisations and mergers of companies will 
continue, which means that the Russian buyers are placing bigger and bigger orders. Fifth, the 
demands for higher quality have increased among the consumers in recent years and brand 
awareness has also grown. Products of the highest quality category are sold to the middle class, but 
the production is still focused on the low-priced product segments and the consumers are very 
price-sensitive (USDA 2004a). 
 
Food industry in Russia is concentrating to the agricultural region of the Leningrad oblast around St 
Petersburg. Food industry is the largest individual sector in St Petersburg, which in 2003 
represented about a third of all industrial production in the city of St Petersburg. The brewing, 
tobacco, meat processing and dairy industries now constitute the backbone of the food industry. The 
largest company in the St Petersburg region is Baltika brewery. However, the local agricultural 
production is not capable of satisfying the demand for raw material in the St Petersburg region in 
terms of either the quantity or quality of the products, which is why the food industry in the region 
is highly dependent on imported raw material. At the moment, however, the domestic production is 
capable of meeting the demand of the bakery and milling industry (Research Institute of the Finnish 
Economy Etla 2002).  
 
The investments to food industry in the St Petersburg region totalled about 6.7 billion roubles in 
2001. About 80 per cent of these investments came from abroad, and most of them were directed to 
beer and tobacco production (Suomenlahden kasvukolmio 2003). The development of the food 
industry increases the demand for technology needed in agriculture in the St Petersburg region 
(Saarinen & Pirilä 2003). This creates markets for machinery, implements, fertilisers, feedingstuffs 
and plant protection products.  
 
One of the strengths of the food sector in St Petersburg is that almost all processors are using 
modern technology and equipment and the local administration supports the development of the 
food sector. Agricultural production as well as the storage and distribution network have made 
significant progress in recent years. The Russian consumers also favour domestic products. 
However, the problems inherent in the food chain are still numerous. The productivity of the sector 
is not very high and the quality of the products should be improved. One problem is that the raw 
materials and equipment needed in the processing largely come from abroad.  The weaknesses in 
the food sector also include problems relating to taxation and education (Suomenlahden 
kasvukolmio 2003).  
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3.4.2 Foreign operators in the food sector 
 
Investments into the Russian food sector have dwindled from the peak level reached in 1998. In 
2003 the direct foreign investments to Russia rose to 6.8 billion dollars. Foodstuffs, drinks and 
tobacco account for about 5 per cent of these investments, while in 1998 this sector represented 
more than a third of all direct investments. At present the industrial sector attracts about a half of 
the investments, trade about a quarter, building less than 5 per cent, and the share of agriculture is 
only about one per cent (Liuhto, Pelto & Lipponen 2004). The boom in the investments of foreign 
companies which related to the economic crisis in 1998 obviously raised the investments in the food 
sector to an unusually high level. Since then the investments have decreased, but they are still quite 
high.  
 






































The investments flowing to the Russian food sector, even though they are diminishing, show that 
the foreign companies trust in the growth of the domestic demand in Russia in the next few years. 
Today it is almost impossible to talk about the Russian food industry without mentioning foreign 
investments and foreign companies in general. Foreign investments directed at the food industry as 
well as improving the primary production have made a significant contribution to the modernisation 
of the sector. The success of agricultural production in Russia is naturally reflected in the food 
industry and vice versa. At present there are two very different kinds of agricultural production, 
because some of the farms are thriving and investing while others are declining. Successful farms 
manage to attract investments and skilled labour. In agricultural production, however, the 
geographic location is also important. Companies located in the Moscow region and close to other 
major cities and regions are doing much better than farms operating in the peripheral regions. This 
is quite natural, because the food companies are investing in operations located close to the large 
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centres. This also promotes agricultural production in these regions, which in turn makes them more 
attractive for the food industry. 
 
In the past couple of years the interest of foreign companies to invest in Russia seems to have 
picked up again. In fact the companies seem to consider that production in Russia is indispensable 
in order to stay on the market. In 2005 many of the giant foreign food companies told that they were 
going to increase their investments to Russia. For example, the Heinz Group based in the United 
States bought the majority share of Petrosojuzist in St Petersburg, which is one of the largest 
manufacturers of ketchup, mayonnaise and butter spreads in Russia. Many foreign companies are 
also starting or increasing the production of vegetable preservatives in Russia. In the beginning of 
2005 the Coca-Cola Company and HBC bought almost a quarter share of the Russian juice 
manufacturer Multon. The PepsiCo is also planning company purchases in Russia. Foreign 
investors have been particularly interested in the brewing industry (Finnpro 2005). Table 10 
presents the largest food industry companies in Russia according to the production sectors. The list 
contains local companies as well as large international companies, such as Nestle and Danone. 
  
Table 10.   Largest food industry companies in different production sectors in Russia.  
Confectionary, cakes, cookies Sales ($ Mil) Meat  Sales ($ Mil)
SladCo 119 Cherkizovsky 350
Babyevsky 180 KamposMos 130
Krasny Oktyaber 126 Omsky Bacon 120
Rot Front 174 AIG Mikhailovsky 50
Rossiya  90 Golden Rooster 350 000 birdsk/wk
Mars 100 Elinar 250 000 birds/wk
Odinstovo 36
Bolshevik 52 '000 t
Kraker 20 '000 t
Ice cream Mio kg Dairy Sales ($ Mil)
Altervest 8 Wimm-Bill-Dann 825
Ice-Fili 15 Prodimeks 500
Nestle 17 Ostankinsky 120 '000 t
Russkiy Holod 27
Servis Kholod 9
Fruit juices Mio ltrs Yogurt Mio kg
Multon 325 Campina 56
Lebedyanskiy 325 Danone 70
Nidan-Ecofruit 170 Ehrmann 70




AO Vena 320  
Source: USDA.  
 
The quality of the domestic production is improving rapidly, which also tightens the competition 
among the food exporters. However, the increase in the domestic production creates new kinds of 
import needs in the food sector. For example, the demand for various kinds of additives and semi-
processed products will be growing (USDA 2004a). In 2002 the import of bulk products to Russia 
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decreased by 16 per cent in the Russian food sector, but the import of semi-finished products grew 
by 30 per cent from the year before to 1.5 billion dollars. The import of, for example, fish and 
crustaceans (most of these for further processing) grew by more than a third to 382 million (USDA 
2004c). 
 
In certain product segments the efficiency of the domestic production has already improved 
considerably. For example, the domestic supply of grains and edible oils is already substituting for 
some of the imports. However, despite the growth and improved quality of the domestic production 
the total imports do not seem to diminish, and in some cases the need for imports is actually 
growing. First, local companies cannot produce sufficient amounts of various kinds of inputs which 
would meet the quality requirements. Second, the food processing companies are growing and 
modernising their production, which means that they need more of various kinds of special inputs, 
such as certain additives, which cannot be supplied locally. Third, through the company mergers the 
financial basis of the local operators has become more solid and they are capable of placing larger 
orders (USDA 2004a). In additions, Russia continues to import various kinds of staple foodstuffs 
such as soybeans, food oils, meat, poultry meat products and milk products, because the reform and 
reorganisation of the agricultural sector is only getting started. The USDA (2004a) estimates that 
the following products continue to possess good sales potential on the Russian market:  
•  Poultry/beef/pork trimmings and offals 
•  Fish and seafood products 
•  Quality prunes, raisins, and other dried fruit 
•  Quality almonds, pecans, other tree nuts, and peanuts 
•  Flavor enhancers for processed meat products 
•  Functional soy concentrates and isolates 
•  Lactose 
•  Quality textured vegetable protein 
•  Gluten Powder 
•  Dextrin and other modified starches 
•  Preservatives and food colours  
•  Essential oils 
•  Seasonings/spices/flavorings 
 
The USDA (2004a) has also listed products which should have sales potential in the future but 
which as yet are not available on the market in significant quantities: 
•  Frozen and soft pasteurized fruits 
•  Various specialised food ingredients 
•  Certified organic/natural ingredients 
•  Kosher and halal-certified ingredients (for Jewish population and Moslem consumers). 
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Snack food (exl. nuts) 215 263 252 -4 %
Breakfast cereals & Pancake Mix 10 18 11 -39 %
Red meats, fresh/chilled/frozen 619 935 1 414 51 %
Red meats, prepared/preserved 65 65 64 -2 %
Poultry meat 366 756 816 8 %
Dairy products (exl. Cheese) 184 230 188 -18 %
Cheese 64 166 235 42 %
Egg & products 4 8 12 50 %
Fresh fruit 559 595 742 25 %
Fresh vegetables 202 162 224 38 %
Processed fruit & vegetables 349 317 380 20 %
Fruit & vegetable juices 57 85 131 54 %
Tree nuts 20 27 23 -15 %
Wine & beer 248 340 361 6 %
Pet foods 14 18 22 22 %
Fish & seafood products 158 280 382 36 %  
Source: USDA.  
 
Table 11 shows the development of the imports of certain foodstuffs to Russia in 2000-2002. The 
import of, for example, meat, cheese and fruit juices has increased rapidly in the past couple of 
years. The demand for fish and crustacean products has also grown considerably. The Russian food 
import market is divided between several countries. Brazil is clearly the number one meat exporter, 
but the market shares of the USA and EU are also significant (see Annex 1). 
 
In 2004 the value of Russian food imports was about 12.8 billion dollars. The largest group of 
countries is the EU-15, whose share in the total Russian food imports is a little less than a third. The 
market share of Brazil is about 12 per cent and that of the new EU Member States a little less than 
10 per cent. Individual countries with significant market shares are the USA (6 per cent), Ukraine (6 
per cent) and China (4 per cent). The Russian food trade will be studied in further detail in the 
subsequent section of the research project.  
 
The operations of companies investing and exporting to the Russian food market suffer from certain 
weaknesses in the Russian economy and society. The customs and duties are highly complex, 
taxation system is unstable, storage and transportation systems are still quite weak and the distances 
are long. The corrupted bureaucracy and especially the ambiguities in the right to land ownership 
cause problems (Vaknin 2003). Often the credits available from the local agents are quite 
expensive, which makes it difficult to purchase higher-quality raw materials for the production 
(USDA 2004a).  
 
Companies operating on the food market must also take account of the retail sector, where 
significant progress has been made in recent years. The State Statistical Bureau of Russia 
(Goskomstat) estimates the value of retail trade in Russia at a little over 131 billion dollars. The 
share of the city of Moscow about 36 billion dollars, which is more than a quarter of the total value 
of retail trade. The value of the retail trade volume in St Petersburg is less than 5 billion dollars. The 
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quite significant difference between Moscow and St Petersburg is partly due to the population of the 
two cities (in Moscow more than double that of St Petersburg), as well as the disposable income of 
the consumers. In Moscow the gross domestic products per capita is more than 6,500 dollars, in St 
Petersburg it is only a little more than 2,000 dollars. In Moscow the per capita GDP is clearly above 
the average in Russia, which is 1,900 dollars per capita. The higher income of the residents of 
Moscow is reflected in the retail trade also in that the share of foodstuffs in the value of the retail 
trade volume is only a little more than 40 per cent, which means that most of the income is already 
spent on something else than food (Liuhto et al. 2004). 
 
In 2003 about 15 per cent of the sale of the Russian food market took place in so-called modern 
retail outlets, i.e. organised chains with supermarkets, hypermarkets and department stores. 
According to an estimate by AcNielsen, in 2004 about a fifth of the retail trade in foodstuffs took 
place in the modern outlets. This means that a significant share of the food trade is still carried out 
outside the modern retail chains (Kaipio & Leppänen 2005).  
 
Retail trade has grown in Russia thanks to the positive economic development. However, it is not 
always easy for the food companies to gain access to the market, because the structure of the retail 
trade is not fully developed as yet. The Russian market is still waiting for the entry of the American 
and European retail traders on a broader front (Lorentz 2004). The foreign chains are interested in 
the markets of only the ten largest cities in Russia, which means their impact on the food market of 
the whole of Russia would be limited. In 2004 the trade in perishables and retail trade in Russia 
were characterised by mergers and expansion to new regions, while the non-organised retail traders 
were losing their positions. The increased mergers lead to a decrease in the number of retail chains, 
while the remaining chains are growing rapidly. The Finnish food companies estimate that the 
organisation of retail trade into chains makes the business increasingly professional. The 
competition between the chains is also growing, which highlights the role of brand products (Kaipio 
& Leppänen 2005).   
 
Certain trends in the Russian retail trade are very well known in western countries. The market 
power of retail outlets in the food chain has grown relative to the food suppliers. The growth in the 
size and purchasing volume of retail trade increases its negotiating power in the chain. In the future 
there will be more and more negotiations on the production of the retail brands. In addition to the 
growth of trade, another significant trend in this sector is the differentiation of the retail outlets. 
Consumer preferences are becoming increasingly diversified as their incomes are growing. The 
production chains are getting shorter and more efficient thanks to the improved logistics (Lorentz 
2004).    
 
The share of the chains in the total value of retail trade is growing especially in areas such as 
Moscow and St Petersburg. Regional chains as well as chains extending to the whole country are 
also evolving in Russia. From the perspective of food producers this gives the opportunity to offer 
their products to a broader range of buyers. According to Lorentz (2004), food companies would 
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benefit if they could find a good partner on the local market. The possibilities for cooperation with 
retail trade improve if the company maintains the high quality of the products, the distribution 
works, and the company invests in the presentation of the product and offers volume discounts. The 
company can also reinforce its brand, which improves the position of the product on the market. 
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4   CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Russian agricultural and food sector has been faced with major changes for some time. In many 
sectors agricultural production has dropped to about half from the volumes at the turn of the 1990s, 
which is why Russia is one of the greatest food importers in the world today. However, Russia has 
set as an objective to reach self-sufficiency in most agricultural sectors during the next decade. This 
is a highly ambitious objective, because the share of imports in the consumption of foodstuffs is still 
very high. The very big agricultural enterprises engaging mainly in grain production constitute the 
most competitive element of Russian agriculture. In the other extreme there are the household plots 
used for cultivating e.g. potatoes and vegetables and for keeping domestic animals. These plots 
account for only 6 per cent of the agricultural land in Russia, but their share in the value of the 
production is about a half. One reason for the significant share of household plots in the value of 
production is the rapid increase in the prices of livestock products.  
 
Crop production is the most competitive sector of Russian agriculture. Russia is a net exporter of 
grains. In recent years the average annual grain exports have been about 10 million tonnes, which is 
about 5 per cent of the total grain exports in the world. The exports from Russia are much smaller 
than those of the five largest grain exporters in the world. Russia is striving to become one of the 
five largest exporters, but at present this seems quite unrealistic. The Russian grain sector suffers 
from weaknesses such as quality problems, relatively low yields per hectare and problems in the 
logistics. However, there is also a great deal of potential in the sector. Investments in agricultural 
corporations increase their vertical integration, which is reflected on the farm level as higher quality 
inputs and more modern technology. 
 
The problems in livestock production appear to be quite serious Milk production has not increased 
much from the level where it fell in the early 1990s. Less than half of the raw milk produced ends 
up in dairies for further processing. According to the forecasts, in the next decade milk production 
in Russia should grow by about 10 per cent and only a little more than half of the production would 
be sent to the dairies. This is still very low compared to the EU countries. Even if the production in 
Russia will be growing, significant quantities of milk products will continue to be imported. For 
example, the import of cheese is expected to almost double during the next decade and butter 
imports should grow as well. In the future cheese imports would account for about half and butter 
imports for about 40 per cent of the total consumption. 
 
Meat production in Russia has also decreased dramatically from the levels about 15 years ago. 
Russia is making serious efforts to increase especially the poultry meat production considerably by 
2010. The objective is to triple the production, but according to international estimates the 
production would grow by about 70 per cent. There is likely to be some decrease in beef 
production. Russia aims to double pork production, but the international forecasts estimate that it 
will grow by about a fifth. At present Russia is clearly a net importer of meat. For example, imports 
represent clearly more than a half of poultry meat consumption. Imported beef represents about a 
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fifth and imported pork about a quarter of the consumption. Meat imports are likely to stay high in 
the future. In fact, according to the forecasts the volumes of meat imports should stay on about the 
same level as they are at present. The domestic production is growing, but imports are needed to 
satisfy the growth in the consumption. The share of imports in the total consumption is going to 
decrease slightly.  
 
The production of foodstuffs has grown quite well in Russia at a steady pace of about 7 per cent a 
year. However, Russia is far from being self-sufficient in foodstuffs, but it is the largest food 
importer in the world. Foodstuffs represent about a fifth of the total imports. Food imports collapsed 
as a result of the economic crisis in 1998, but in 2001 they were again growing. In 2004 the value of 
the food imports to Russia totalled about 12.5 billion dollars. Of the different countries or groups 
the share of the EU in the food imports to Russia is the largest, about 40 per cent.  
 
Today it is almost impossible to talk about the Russian agricultural and food sector without 
mentioning the foreign companies and their investments. While food exports to Russia are growing, 
the investments of both foreign and domestic food companies have made a significant contribution 
to the development and modernisation of the local industry. It seems that, in fact, most foreign 
companies consider that concentrating only on export operations is insufficient. There is also a need 
to produce locally to secure the market position. Investments are not only directed to the food 
industry but also to the whole food chain all the way to the farm. For example, the French dairy 
company Danone gives out loans for purchasing cooling tanks on farms and offers instruction in 
milk production to obtain high-quality raw material. This is why the investments have very concrete 
impacts on the farm level as well. 
 
The growth and improvement in the quality of the domestic production does not necessarily reduce 
the need for imported raw material. In certain sectors the need for imports may even grow as the 
local companies are not capable of producing sufficient quantities of certain special inputs and 
additives. The reform and reorganisation of basic agricultural production is still far from being 
completed, which means that basic foodstuffs such as meat will have to be imported in the future as 
well.  
 
Foreign and domestic investments are highly important for the development of the Russian 
agricultural and food sector, but obviously these do not cover the whole country. In fact, most of the 
investments are directed to the Moscow and St Petersburg regions. Thus there is a great deal of 
agricultural and food production in Russia which has not been influenced by the foreign 
investments. Because of this there are two very different types of agriculture and food production in 
the country: certain companies invest and attract investments, while the prospects of the others are 
quite gloomy.  
 
Today there is a kind of race under way on the Russian market, as the foreign companies are 
striving to get their share of the growing market. The Russian agricultural and food sector has taken 
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important steps forwards, but there are still serious challenges to be faced. It is in the interest of the 
food industry to find raw material from nearby, but at least during the next decade high quantities of 
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Annex 2. Russia’s map. 
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